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Advertiser Liability: Soldier of Fortune
Cases Take Deadly Aim
at Publishers
by NEIL L. SHAPIRO*
and KARL OLSON**
Two recent cases involving Soldier of Fortune magazine's
mercenary advertisements take deadly aim at the relative im-
munity publications traditionally have enjoyed in their publi-
cation of advertisements. These two cases belong to an,,
increasing number of suits against publications that advertise
products or services which may prove dangerous. The suits
have thus far produced a bewildering array of conflicting opin-
ions, but until Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.'
and Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.2 marched
into the picture, there were virtually no judgments against
any publisher for simply running an advertisement.
The liability imposed on Soldier of Fortune magazine poten-
tially leaves publications liable for harm resulting from adver-
tisements. Three standards of liability seem possible, but the
Soldier of Fortune cases leave the question of the applicable
standard unanswered. The three possibilities include: (1) a
negligence standard; (2) liability only when it is obvious the
publisher should suspect the product is harmful; and (3) liabil-
ity only when the ad promotes a likelihood of lawless conduct,
which in turn creates a substantial risk of serious bodily harm.
The authors suggest the third is the most appropriate standard
because it discourages publications from promoting or adver-
tising violence, but avoids potentially ruinous liability for run-
ning advertisements which are on their face legal and do not
give obvious notice of the product's harmful character.
California boasts one of the oldest advertiser liability cases.
* Partner, Cooper, White & Cooper, San Francisco.
** Associate, Cooper, White & Cooper, San Francisco.
1. 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
2. 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
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In Hanberry v. Hearst,I the plaintiff bought a pair of shoes ad-
vertised in Hearst's Good Housekeeping Magazine. The shoes
bore the "Good Housekeeping Consumers' Guaranty Seal,"
and the magazine stated: "We satisfy ourselves that products
advertised in Good Housekeeping are good ones and that the
advertising claims made for them in our magazine are
truthful.
'4
When the plaintiff slipped and sustained serious injuries,
she sued Hearst, among others, claiming that the shoes were
defectively manufactured, that she relied on the Good House-
keeping endorsement in buying the shoes, and that the shoe
manufacturer paid the publisher to use the seal. The court
held that Hanberry stated a claim for negligent misrepresenta-
-tion, but rejected claims for breach of warranty and product
liability against the publisher.5
Perhaps because most publications do not give any form of
approval to the products they advertise, Hanberry did not
open any floodgates of liability for publishers. Indeed, after
Hanberry it would be legal folly to do so.
A plaintiff recently attempted to expand the Hanberry doc-
trine in Walters v. Seventeen Magazine,6 but without success.
The plaintiff there, a tampon user who developed toxic shock
syndrome, sued Seventeen because it had run an ad for the
tampon. Despite plaintiff's arguments that the ad was placed
amidst feature articles on puberty, gynecology and menstrua-
tion, and misled young readers into thinking Seventeen en-
dorsed the tampons, the court distinguished Hanberry and
rejected the suit. The court warned:
In the absence of any cause of action supported by traditional
theories, we are loathe to create a new tort of negligently fail-
ing to investigate the safety of an advertised product. Such a
tort would require publications to maintain huge staffs scruti-
nizing and testing each product offered. The enormous cost of
such groups, along with skyrocketing insurance rates, would
deter many magazines from accepting advertising, hastening
their demise from lack of revenue. Others would comply, but
raise their prices beyond the reach of the average reader.
Still others would be wiped out by tort judgments, never to
revive. Soon the total number of publications in circulation
3. 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
4. Id. at 682, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
5. Id at 687, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 524.




Similar thoughts were expressed in Pittman v. Dow Jones &
Co.,8 in which the publisher of the Wall Street Journal was
sued for running an ad for a Texas financial institution in
which the plaintiffs lost a $50,000 investment. The court held
there was no duty to investigate the accuracy of ads because
"courts have placed more value on the societal benefits of in-
'formation availability than on the rights of private persons
who claim to have been harmed."9
The Pittman and Walters decisions were consistent with the
traditional reluctance of courts to impose liability on publica-
tions for ads they run. Sympathetic as the facts may have
been for the plaintiffs involved, neither decision should have
caused much soul-searching. Neither a seemingly bona fide fi-
nancial institution nor a nationally distributed tampon product
should have alerted a publisher to any obvious dangers. The
Soldier of Fortune ads, however, were very different.
The first Soldier of Fortune case, Norwood v. Soldier of For-
tune Magazine, Inc.,'0 involved two different ads that ran in
the mercenary magazine in 1985. The first, aptly called the
Savage ad, read: "GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year-old-professional
mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam Veteran. Discreet and very
private. Bodyguard, courier, and other special skills. All jobs
considered," with the advertiser's telephone number. The
other ad read: "GUN FOR HIRE. NAM sniper instructor.
SWAT. Pistol, rifle, security specialist, body guard, courier
plus. All jobs considered. Privacy guaranteed," also with a
name and telephone number. The plaintiff claimed that he
was wounded by assassins who were hired through these
advertisements.
The court rejected Soldier of Fortune's summary judgment
motion with a vociferous distinction of cases like New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan:1
It is likely that most citizens would believe that [the adver-
tisement in question] is a far cry from the type of responsible
public debate which the United States Supreme Court obvi-
ously intends to foster by cases such as New York Times ....
7. Id. at 1122, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
8. 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La. 1987), qff'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987).
9. 662 F. Supp. at 922.
10. 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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The plethora of individual rights which we have in this nation
of free men is undoubtedly a source of our strength, but in a
sense, is also a source of, or at least the catalyst for, signifi-
cant lawlessness that pervades our society. While few of us
would want to change our system which protects such a large
array of 'rights,' it may be that we have more than most of us
need, and more than is good for a majority of us.12
With those stern words ringing in their ears, the publishers
of Soldier of Fortune reportedly settled the Norwood case.'
3
However, they did not settle a 1988 case, Eimann v. Soldier of
Fortune Magazine, Inc., 4 and that decision may bankrupt the
magazine. In Eimann, the ad ran: "EX-MARINES--67-69
'Nam vets-ex-DI-weapons specialist-jungle warfare, pilot,
M.E., high risk assignments U.S. or overseas," with the adver-
tiser's telephone number.'5 The decedent was killed by the
advertiser, who was hired by decedent's husband. The dece-
dent's mother and son brought suit against the magazine for
negligence. Soldier of Fortune, again unsuccessfully, moved
for summary judgment, 6 and a Texas jury later returned a
verdict for $1.9 million in actual damages and $7.5 million in
punitive damages.1
7
The results in the two Soldier of Fortune cases are not sur-
prising, given the facts. Few of us would be inclined to defend
a mercenary magazine's right to publish ads which either co-
vertly or overtly proclaim the availability of hit men. Many of
us would want to see the innocent victims of such criminal
conduct obtain some recompense. However, the holdings of
those two cases, allowing recovery for the magazine's negli-
gent publication of the ads, appear to be inconsistent with
Walters v. Seventeen, a case with an equally compelling
rationale.
It is difficult to fashion a rule of general application to re-
solve all foreseeable factual situations. One might argue that
there is nothing wrong with a rule permitting recovery for the
negligent publication of an ad. But, as the Walters court
warned, such a rule would force publishers to hire an army of
12. 651 F. Supp. at 1401-02.
13. "Gun for Hire" Had Many Clients-Bumbling Gang of Killers Left Trail of
Death, Terror, L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
14. 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
15. Id. at 864.
16. Id. at 867.
17. Soldier of Fortune Calls for Help, L.A. Times, July 7, 1988, § 4, at 2, col. 5.
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ad-checkers to police the products hawked by their advertis-
ers, and even with that it might be impossible to successfully
screen all advertisers.'" In the Pittman case, for example, the
court noted that the Wall Street Journal did make some effort
to investigate the advertiser before accepting the ad. A negli-
gence standard could have severe financial repercussions on
those publications, the vast majority of which depend on ad-
vertising revenue as the lifeblood that allows them to offer
factual reporting and editorial comment.
A second possible standard would allow recovery only when
there is obvious reason for the publisher to suspect that the
product advertised is harmful or dangerous. Such a rule
would not undermine the Seventeen case, absent prior knowl-
edge of the toxic shock problem. It might allow recovery in
the Soldier of Fortune cases where both the ads themselves
and the medium in which they appeared provided obvious rea-
son to suspect danger. Unfortunately, such a standard might
also create liability for publications that run advertisements
for tobacco products, 9 alcohol, and even automobiles, all of
which have known dangerous qualities. Therefore, the stan-
dard provides inadequate protection for mainstream
publishers.
The appropriate standard is one which would allow recovery
only when the ad in question promotes, or clearly creates, a
probability or likelihood of lawless conduct, which in turn cre-
ates a substantial risk of serious bodily harm. Such a standard
would not conflict with the results in the Soldier of Fortune
cases; nor would it conflict with the result in the California
case of Weirum v. RKO General,20 in which a radio station
was held liable when its own advertised contest incited two
18. 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1122, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101, 103 (1987).
19. The Public Health Director of Allentown, Pa., recently asked the Allentown
Morning Call to stop publishing ads for "addictive, carcinogenic and toxic" tobacco
products to demonstrate the paper's involvement in a community-wide smoking ces-
sation project. The Morning Call is considering the request, although its publisher
said it has not yet stopped running the ads "because the government hasn't seen fit
to ban smoking. It remains a commercially viable product." The health director said
he hopes other newspapers would follow The Morning Call's lead if it stops carrying
tobacco ads. According to the Newspaper Advertising Bureau in New York City, 14
newspapers (out of 1,700) already ban tobacco ads. News Media Update, Feb. 4, 1989,
at 6 (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, National Newspaper Associa-
tion). It goes without saying, however, that the voluntary cessation of such ads is
wholly different from liability in tort for carrying them.
20. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
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teens to drive recklessly in chase of a prize-holding disc
jockey. Although Weirum was decided unanimously on a neg-
ligence theory, it could arguably have been decided on nar-
rower grounds. More importantly, Weirum did not involve an
ad for another's product; it involved a radio station's own
contest.
Indeed, the subsequent cases of Olivia N. v. National Broad-
casting Co." and Bill v. Superior Court22 have both distin-
guished Weirum and rejected attempts to fasten liability on a
broadcaster and movie producer, respectively, whose dramatic
works allegedly, but unknowingly and unintentionally, incited
lawless activity and violence. As the court in Olivia N. ob-
served: "The Weirum broadcasts actively and repeatedly en-
couraged listeners to speed to announced locations. Liability
was imposed on the broadcaster for urging listeners to act in
an inherently dangerous manner. 
'23
The advertising cases, involving conduct which lurks in the
shadows of the first amendment,2 4 not in the bright sunshine
of pure speech, have created a panoply of conflicting decisions.
The court in Eimann 2 5 implicitly held that the speech in ques-
tion was entitled to some protection, but that allowing a sim-
ple negligence action did not violate the first amendment. The
authors suggest, however, that a negligence standard for the
publishers of other entities' advertisements provides insuffi-
cient protection. It overlooks the fact that a publication often
will have no effective way of evaluating the accuracy of claims
made by its advertisers26 and might have to "maintain huge
staffs scrutinizing and testing each product offered.
'27
Moreover, in almost all cases, a consumer's interest in being
free from misleading or dangerous advertising is protected by
21. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981).
22. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1982).
23. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
24. The Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that commercial speech is
entitled to lesser protection than "core" first amendment speech, and that it is not
entitled to any first amendment protection at all unless it concerns lawful activity
and is not misleading. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980).
25. 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988). See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying
text.
26. Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922-23 (E.D. La. 1987), off'd,
834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
27. Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1122, 241 Cal. Rptr.
101, 103 (1987). See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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the availability of a right of action against the advertiser itself.
An advertiser presumably knows the danger of its product,
while, in almost all cases, the medium running the ad does
not.
Perhaps Soldier of Fortune can marshal an arsenal of good
first amendment attacks to overcome natural antipathy to-
ward the publication and overturn the multi-million dollar
verdict against it. 28 For now, however, the possibility of physi-
cal assaults upon-and murder of-innocent victims bids fair
to deprive Soldier of Fortune of any first amendment protec-
tion for obviously dangerous advertisements.
28. Hustler magazine did so just last year. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the
Supreme Court held that the first amendment barred liaility for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress in a suit brought by the Rev. Jerry Falwell against Hustler
Magazine for its ad parody which depicted him having a drunken incestuous rendez-
vous with his mother in an outhouse. 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988).
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